Build the mental model
Guided explanations, visible consequences and supported decisions for newer personnel.
Learn to recognise hazardous energy, select and prove an isolation, control change, and reinstate plant without losing the thread.
Guided explanations, visible consequences and supported decisions for newer personnel.
Independent choices, P&ID reasoning and fault diagnosis for people planning or installing isolations.
ALARP, variations, interactions, change and reinstatement decisions for isolation authorities.
The boundary remains controlled from task definition through reinstatement and learning. Select a stage to inspect its decisions and failure traps.
Manipulate a simplified isolation. The model tracks upstream pressure, valve condition, cavity pressure, downstream pressure and evidence.
Gas compressor C-201 requires intrusive work while the adjacent train remains live at 74 barg. Your decisions change the isolation state and later options.
Your first answer is recorded. Correcting an answer supports learning but does not erase the original decision.
Design rationale, HSG253 traceability and executed checks for this prototype.
The product follows a decision-first architecture. The lifecycle establishes the system model; the isolation laboratory exposes causal plant behaviour; the compressor scenario integrates hardware, documentation, people and time; the assessment samples transfer. Three routes alter scaffolding and feedback tone. The experience deliberately returns to proving, change and reinstatement because these are points where a superficially complete isolation can fail.
Plant state is held as data: valve positions, pressure, proof, bleed condition, motive power, permits, scope and reinstatement dependencies. Visual status derives from that state. Unsafe choices identify the remaining hazard and the evidence needed before work proceeds. The model avoids presenting positive isolation as infallible or using a universal hierarchy without task risk context.
Assessment retains first-attempt performance, domain scores and critical errors. Repeated guessing cannot create a competent result. “Competent in this demonstrator” is distinct from site authorisation, which remains dependent on workplace assessment and the organisation's competence system.
The isolation laboratory couples valve, bleed, pressure, proof and hidden-fault states. A blocked bleed can create a false impression from the gauge; proof logic then rejects the evidence. The scenario carries earlier choices into change-control and reinstatement decisions.
| Component | HSG253 basis | Application |
|---|---|---|
| System principles | paras 12–16, 22–25 | ALARP, tolerability, controlled lifecycle |
| Human factors and competence | paras 28, 42–57 | Error traps, route depth, competence caveat |
| Work control and P&IDs | paras 69–84 | Certificates, cross-references, common isolation and change |
| Hazard/risk assessment | paras 87–108 | Scope, substances, task hazards, live-plant decision |
| Method selection | paras 109–124; Figure 4 | Positive/proved/non-proved, DBB/SBB, risk basis |
| Variations | paras 128–141 | Authority challenge and approval controls |
| Planning and installation | paras 142–155 | Walkdown, initial/final isolation, security and tags |
| DVPF | paras 156–164 | Pressure and inventory removal |
| Proving and monitoring | paras 165–183 | Proof, false indications, monitoring and failed proof |
| Reinstatement | paras 184–188 | Permit dependencies, overrides, blinds and post-start checks |